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Abstract This paper provides new field evidence on the role of probability numeracy
in health insurance purchase. Our regression results, based on rich survey panel data,
indicate that the expenditure on two out of three measures of health insurance first
rises with probability numeracy and then falls again. This non-monotonic relationship
suggests that probability numeracy affects health insurance decisions through several
channels. In the third case—the obligatory Dutch basic health insurance—we find
that high levels of probability numeracy coincide with a lower deductible choice. We
discuss possible explanations for the patterns we find, including status quo bias and
ambiguity aversion, and the related policy implications.
Keywords Numeracy · Health insurance · Risk attitudes · Deductible ·
Ambiguity aversion
JEL Classification C23 · D03 · D14
1 Introduction
Consumers do not always have a completely rational approach toward the purchase
of insurance. In some instances, individuals have been found to under-insure relative
to what the rational benchmark would suggest (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Ito and Kono
2010; Giné et al. 2008), while in other situations they tend to over-insure (Barseghyan
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et al. 2012; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2004; Huysentruyt and Read 2010; Sydnor 2006).
Behavioral factors that have been advanced to explain such deviations from rational
choice include the difficulty to deal with small probability events, the feelings of regret
toward uninsured losses, and the susceptibility to context and framing (Johnson et al.
1993; Liebman and Zeckhauser 2008; Kunreuther et al. 2013).
This study examines whether the demand for health insurance is affected by indi-
viduals’ level of probability numeracy. Insurance purchase is ultimately a financial
decision in the face of uncertainty.Whether someone buys insurance basically depends
on his or her risk assessment and risk preferences. Risk assessment is based on the
person’s knowledge (private and public information) and (cognitive) skills, including
numeracy, that is, “the ability to understand probabilistic and mathematical concepts”
(Peters 2012). For the purposes of this paper, we are particularly interested in prob-
ability numeracy, which we define as the specific ability to understand and process
probabilistic concepts.
To study the relationship between health insurance decisions and probability numer-
acy,we use rich survey panel data on the purchase of threemeasures of health insurance
and combine this with information on subjects’ probability numeracy and an extensive
set of individual characteristics, including their stated and revealed risk preferences.
The measures of health insurance purchase that we consider, are (A) whether or not
someone has complementary health insurance, (B) totalmonthly expenditure on health
insurances and (C) the amount of voluntary deductible in the Dutch universal health
insurance.
If probability numeracy plays an important role in insurance purchase decisions,
then this would have implications for social policy. For example, in ageing societies
there is a growing budgetary pressure towards further privatization of health care
costs, through increasing copayments and private insurance. In these circumstances it
is increasingly relevant to know whether people are adequately equipped to make this
kind of complex decisions and under which conditions they are able to cope with the
challenging choices they face.
Our regression results indicate that the relationship between numeracy and two of
our measures of health insurance purchase appears to be non-monotonic. Complemen-
tary health insurance purchases and total expenditure on health insurance first rise with
probability numeracy and then, at the higher numeracy levels, fall again. In the case
of the obligatory Dutch basic health insurance, we find that high levels of probability
numeracy coincide with a lower deductible choice.
We discuss how the non-monotonic effect of probability numeracy on complemen-
tary health insurance and total health insurance expenditure could be explained. We
speculate ex post that a minimal level of numeracy is needed to have an interest in
purchasing health insurance at all. At intermediate numeracy levels, people see the
value in health insurance but are unable tomake reasonable risk assessments. At higher
numeracy levels, people become more and more able to determine the actual level of
risk instead of experiencing a state of ambiguity. That would allow them to choose a
better aimed—and on average lower—level of health insurance. The challenge from
a policy point of view would then be to get people to be both active and selective in
their health insurance purchase decisions.
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
The literature on the relationship between numeracy and complex decision making,
like insurance purchase, indicates that numeracy is a very relevant characteristic. Peters
et al. (2006) present a series of four studies that explore how the ability to work with
probability numbers relates to performance on judgment and decision tasks. They
find that highly numerate individuals were less susceptible to framing effects than
less numerate individuals. High numeracy is generally, though not always, helpful
for making better decisions. They conclude that numerical ability appears to matter
to judgment and decisions in important ways and that this effect is not due to gen-
eral intelligence. Pachur and Galesic (2012) corroborate these conclusions. They find
that high numeracy individuals are more likely to choose the option with the highest
expected value, guessed less often and relied less on a simple risk-minimizing strategy.
There is also specific attention for numeracy in the health domain. Reyna et al.
(2009) present a review of literature on health literacy. They find that low numeracy
distorts perceptions of risks and benefits of screening, reducesmedication compliance,
impedes access to treatments and appears to adversely affect medical outcomes. Low
numeracy is also associated with greater susceptibility to mood, framing and biases
in judgment and decision making. They do stress the fact that there is a need for
more empirical work as the foundation for designing evidence-based policies and
interventions to improve decision making and health outcomes.
An example of how increasingly complicated (public) insurance programs threaten
to put the less numerate at a disadvantage is provided by Wood et al. (2011). They
examine the case of the Medicare prescription drug program (Part D). This program
has been designed to maximize choice for the consumer, making it a highly complex
decision task with dozens of options. They find that participants performed better with
less choice versus more choice, and that numeracy plays a critical role in decision
making across decision domains and across the lifespan.
An indication of the direction inwhich lownumeracy could steer insurance purchase
decisions is given by Chan and Elbel (2012), who look at the complex supplemental
coverage landscape in addition to traditional Medicare. They found that people in
the lower third of the cognitive ability and numeracy distributions are at least eleven
percentage points less likely than those in the upper third to enroll in a supplemental
Medicare insurance plan and thus lack the financial protection and other potential
benefits of supplemental enrolment.
A potentially relevant policy option is studied by Gaurav et al. (2011). They report
on a field experiment which offered an innovative new financial product, rainfall
insurance, to 600 small-scale farmers in India. They evaluate the effect of a financial
literacy training using a randomized controlled trial and find that financial education
has a positive and significant effect on rainfall insurance adoption, increasing take-up
from 8 to 16%.
Based on the above, probability numeracy can be expected to play a role in insurance
purchase decisions. It is not yet straightforward, though, what the directionwould be of
the expected impact of probability numeracy on different specific insurance purchase
cases. The less probability numerate can on average be expected to make the less
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rational choice. That could in theory result in buying too little insurance, as seems to
be the case with Medicare, but it could also lead to over-insurance.
The less probability numerate have been found to be more prone to framing effects.
A hypothesis that seems to follow naturally from this, is that less numerate individuals
are less likely to deviate from the default choice. In many cases this would mean that
numeracy increases insurance demand, since getting insurance usually requires an
active choice. But in the case of deductible choice that we study, we would expect the
opposite result (i.e., more exposure to risk for the numerate), since the default here
is to have a zero voluntary deductible (on top of a fixed mandatory deductible). The
numerate would be more likely to deviate from this and thus end up with a relatively
lower level of insurance.
3 Data
The analyses are based on data from a variety of surveys of the LISS (Longitudinal
Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg
University, The Netherlands). The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch
individuals. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from
the population register. The panel members take part in monthly Internet surveys. If
necessary for their participation, households are providedwith a computer and Internet
connection. The panel is in full operation since October 2007. Background variables
like age, gender, household composition, education and several income measures are
updated at regular time intervals by one member of the household. A longitudinal
survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including
work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality.
The panel also contains a number of separate unique studies on a range of subjects,
like measuring disease prevention, time use and consumption or risk attitudes. This
paper combines information from several of these studies (see “Appendix 1”).
3.1 Health Insurance Purchase
We analyze three separate dependent variables (A–C). In this section we describe the
data sources we have used for these analyses.
3.1.1 Complementary Health Insurance (A)
In the Netherlands everyone is obliged to have basic health insurance and all insurers
are obliged to accept every applicant, at community-rated premiums. Premiums can
differ between insurers and typically amount to 100 euro per month per person.1
Children below the age of 18 years are insured free of charge, andwithout a (mandatory
or voluntary) deductible.
1 The average nominal premium for the basic health insurance policy in 2011 was 1262 euro (Vektis 2011).
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On top of the Dutch mandatory basic health insurance policy everyone can decide
whether or not to take a complementary health insurance policy. Complementary
health insurance can cover those health expenditures that are otherwise not covered,
like dental care, physiotherapy or alternative medicine. Insurers are not obliged to
accept everyone for their complementary health insurance policies and are allowed
to charge extra because of someone’s age and/or health status.2 In November and
December 2009–2011 the following question was posed to each member of the LISS
panel: “Did you take out a complementary health insurance in <year> (for instance
for dentistry, physiotherapy or alternative medicine)?”
Around 84%of our sample reports having a complementary health insurance in that
period. According to Vektis, the healthcare information centre established by Dutch
health insurers, the Dutch population average was around 89% in that period. There is
a slightly downward trend over the years; in 2006 around 93% had a complementary
health insurance. This percentage is known to be relatively higher for those who
participate in a collective insurance policy and for women. Also, it first rises with age,
but around the age of eighty it starts to drop again (Vektis 2012).
3.1.2 Health Insurance Premiums (B)
The question posed to each member of the LISS panel was: “How much is the
health insurance premium in total (including premiums for supplementary policies)
per [month in<year>]3?” Themedian health insurance premium of those respondents
who only pay for themselves rises from around 114 euro per month in 2009 to around
127 euro per month in 2011, with on average 80% within a range from 90 to 150 euro
a month.4
3.1.3 Voluntary Deductible (C)
In November and December 2009–2011 the following question was posed to each
member of the LISS panel: “In <year> you have a mandatory deductible of
<X> euro. Besides a voluntary deductible is possible. How much is your voluntary
deductible in <year>?” We removed those respondents who reported that they do not
pay the health insurance premiums for the basic policy for themselves or who did not
answer that question (3 and 5% of our sample respectively).
2 It is possible to take out the basic and the complementary health insurance policies from different insurers,
but this is usually more expensive and extremely rare. About 0.2% of the Dutch population take out their
basic and their complementary health insurance policies at separate insurers (Vektis 2012).
3 For those paying at different intervals than per month, we calculated their monthly expenditure.
4 As we only have information on the total health premium paid, we are unable to provide detailed
information on the separate premium paid for the basic health insurance policy and the premium paid for
the complementary health insurance policy (if applicable). If we look at the almost 500 observations in
analysis B where respondents do not have a complementary health insurance, they pay almost 100 euro on
average per month for their health insurance. In the 2100 observations in analysis B where respondents do
have complementary health insurance, they pay on average just over 127 euro per month for their health
insurance.
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The percentage of our sample reporting a positive voluntary deductible rises from
16% in 2009 to 19% in 2011 (excluding the group that answered “don’t know”,
which drops from 15% of respondents in 2009 to 13% in 2011). The Dutch population
average for having a positive voluntary deductible in that periodwas around6%(Vektis
2011). It is not unusual to find this kind of difference between survey and registration
data. E.g. Gorter et al. (2012) find similarly higher fractions in their sample. Especially
the fractions that chose voluntary deductibles of 100 or 200 euro are relatively high in
our sample. Frompopulation data it is also known that the average voluntary deductible
almost continuously drops with age, except for a short rise when people are in their
thirties, and that women on average choose a substantial lower voluntary deductible
than men (Vektis 2013).
3.2 Probability Numeracy
To determine the probability numeracy of the individuals in our sample we construct a
probability numeracy scale, based on the questionsCarman andKooreman (2014) used
in their LISS study “Disease prevention”. Their survey was conducted in September
2008. It was sent to 8143 panel members of whom 5818 (71.4%) responded. The
survey contained eleven questionswhich required a basic understanding of percentages
and probabilities. Together, these 11 items form the Numeracy Scale developed by
Lipkus et al. (2001), which was used in the aforementioned four studies by Peters
et al. (2006) as well. The LISS study also contained two sets of questions which
required internal consistency which provided an extra opportunity to assess one’s
probability numeracy. The thus constructed probability numeracy scale runs from0 (all
questions were answered incorrectly) till 13 (all questions were answered correctly).
On average subjects scored 10.2 correct answers. Themedian score was 11. Somewhat
over 20% reached the maximum score of 13. Almost 12% answered more than half
of the questions incorrectly. “Appendix 2” gives a complete overview of the questions
(Table 3), including the percentages of correct answers, and some more descriptive
statistics (Table 4). To allow for non-linear effects in our regression analyseswe added a
quadratic term of probability numeracy to our regression specification.We also looked
at probability numeracy quintile dummies. For more details, see the results section.
3.3 Alpha—Overestimating Risks
Carman and Kooreman (2014) also calculate the panel members’ tendency to overesti-
mate risks, based on the difference between perceived and epidemiologically predicted
risks. They summarize the degree of bias in a single parameter—alpha—based on the
probability weighting function of Prelec (1998): w(p) = exp[−(− ln p)α]. If alpha
equals one, there is no bias. Smaller values of alpha indicate overestimation of small
chances. Values larger than one conversely indicate underestimation of small chances.
Yet, almost 90% of the panel members has an alpha below 1 and the median estimated
alpha is 0.50. So, on average, the respondents have the tendency to (substantially)
overestimate small risks. E.g. an alpha of 0.50 corresponds with overestimating a true
risk of 0.01 at a level of 0.117.
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3.4 Risky Behavior
In our analyses we look at several measures for risky behavior and their relationship
to health insurance purchase decisions. Examples of risky behavior we look at include
smoking (yes/no), daily drinking (drinking alcohol almost every day over the last
12 months, yes/no), obesity (BMI over 30, yes/no) and whether or not someone is
self-employed.
3.5 Deductible Discounts
The advantage of a higher voluntary deductible is the corresponding discount on the
insurance premium. The LISS core Health study does not contain the discount the
respondents received, but it does contain the insurer where the respondents took out
their basic health insurance policy. We collected detailed information on the discounts
per insurer and level of voluntary deductible from the Dutch Healthcare Authority
(NZa).5 For the effect of the relative level of discount of the insurer where the respon-
dent has taken out his basic health insurance policy, we add the discount the insurer
gives at a voluntary deductible of 500 euro as an explanatory variable to the analysis.
In some cases a single insurer offers multiple basic health care policies with differing
discounts at the voluntary deductible of 500 euro. In those cases the average discount
the insurer offered over his policies was used. Not all insurers were included in the list
of discounts of the NZa, so there was a small loss in observations. The match varies
from 92.1% in 2010 (3615 out of 3924 observations) to 94.3% in 2009 (4075 out of
4321 observations).
4 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the regression analyses we performed on separate
measures of health insurance purchase. We estimate the following model:
IPi,t = f (PNi , RAi , X ′i,t−1) + εi,t (1)
In this formula, IPi,t stands for Insurance Purchase by individual (i) at year (t), PN for
Probability Numeracy and RA for Risk Attitudes. The measures of health insurance
purchase that we consider, are (A) whether or not someone has complementary health
insurance, (B) total monthly expenditure on health insurances and (C) the amount
of voluntary deductible in the Dutch universal health insurance. We include several
measures for risk attitude and make use of a range of control variables (X ′), such as
age, gender, education and income. The analysis is done at the individual level, but
in about one third of the cases more than one household member is included in the
analysis, so we use clustered standard errors at the household level.
5 The NZa is the supervisory body for all the healthcare markets in the Netherlands. The NZa supervises
both healthcare providers and insurers.
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We construct a panel data set with several observations for each of the three depen-
dent variables we study. For the personal background characteristics (e.g. age, gender
and income) we use the values at December of the year (t −1), because most decisions
on health insurance purchase take place in that period. We thus have a complete panel
data set for the years 2009–2011.
For our analyses we make use of random-effects GLS regressions. We use random
effects because of the fact that some of our key explanatory variables are observed
only once, most importantly Probability Numeracy and several of the risk attitude
measures. Because cognitive abilities, especially during adulthood, are found to be
fairly stable over time (Plomin et al. 1994; Neisser et al. 1996), Probability Numer-
acy can relatively safely be assumed to be time-invariant for our analyses. On the
stability of risk attitude measures there is some debate among psychologists, primar-
ily about the importance of domain-specificity. Weber et al. (2002) find respondents’
degree of risk taking highly domain-specific. Dohmen et al. (2011), on the other hand,
find that risk-attitudes are relatively stable across different contexts, but they do find
an age profile in risk attitudes: on average the willingness to take risks decreases
with age. Yet, they show that the impact of age appears to be relatively small in
financial matters. All in all, this means that the need to presume risk attitudes to be
time-invariant is somewhat of a disadvantage, but not a prohibitive objection, given
the timeframe (a maximum of three years) and the fact that age itself is part of our
regression specifications too. We conduct Hausman tests and find that the difference
in coefficients between the fixed-effects and the random-effects regression is system-
atic at the 5%-level in two out of our three regression specifications (A and C). The
Hausman p values are shown in (Table 2). Regression specification B, concerning
the total monthly expenditure on health insurance, thus delivers the most convinc-
ing evidence on the non-linear effect of probability numeracy on health insurance
purchase.
4.1 Analysis A: Complementary Health Insurance
4.1.1 Introduction
As we explained in Sect. 3, complementary health insurance can cover those health
expenditures that are not covered by the Dutch basic health insurance policy, like
dental care, physiotherapy or alternative medicine. Table 1 presents some descriptive
statistics on the panel data set we have constructed for the three separate regression
analyses. For analysis A we can make use of data on 2752 individuals whom we
observe 2.1 times on average in our panel. About 84% of the respondents has taken
out complementary health insurance in the period 2009–2011. The average age in our
sample is 52 years. Half of the respondents is female, three quarters are part of a couple
and about as many people own their home. About 5% is self-employed. One in twelve
has a university degree. One in five smokes and there are almost as many respondents
who drink alcohol on a daily basis. About one in eight is obese. Somewhat over a
fifth has savings (current accounts, savings accounts, term deposit accounts, savings
bonds or savings certificates) with a total value of over 25,000 euros. Almost 60%
123
Probability Numeracy and Health Insurance Purchase 27
Table 1 Descriptive statistics—health insurance purchase, 2009–2011











B) Personal monthly health insurance
premiums (e)
122 8.12
C) Voluntary deductible (e)b 39.7 104
Probability numeracy (1–13) 10.2 2.68 10.1 2.77 10.3 2.62
Age (18–96) 51.7 15.2 49.7 16.4 52.5 14.9
Self-assessed health status (1=poor,
5=excellent)
3.12 0.759 3.14 0.777 3.12 0.755
Femalea 0.504 0.500 0.574 0.495 0.498 0.500
Couplea 0.750 0.433 0.539 0.499 0.752 0.432
Homeownera 0.721 0.449 0.634 0.482 0.727 0.445
Self-employeda 0.050 0.218 0.051 0.220 0.052 0.222
Net monthly household income (e) 2893 5014 2619 1660 2917 5286
Number of children at home 0.715 1.06 0.527 0.921 0.685 1.04
Educ(1)—Primary schoola 0.084 0.278 0.087 0.281 0.079 0.270
Educ(2)—Intermediate secondarya 0.267 0.443 0.260 0.439 0.269 0.444
Educ(3)—Higher secondarya 0.098 0.298 0.108 0.311 0.096 0.294
Educ(4)—Intermediate vocationala 0.213 0.410 0.198 0.398 0.211 0.408
Educ(5)—Higher vocationala 0.254 0.435 0.261 0.439 0.261 0.439
Educ(6)—Universitya 0.083 0.275 0.086 0.280 0.084 0.277
Smokera 0.216 0.411 0.263 0.441 0.210 0.407
Daily drinkera 0.197 0.397 0.186 0.389 0.204 0.403
Obesea 0.130 0.336 0.121 0.326 0.130 0.337
Savings > e25,000a 0.228 0.419 0.192 0.394 0.241 0.428
Collective insurancea 0.598 0.490 0.527 0.499 0.611 0.488
Insurer’s discount at e500 voluntary
deductible (e)
215 38.2 217 37.9 215 38.2
Alpha 0.444 0.683 0.475 0.604 0.438 0.689
N 2752 1421 2534
N×T 5661 2596 5037
For the personal background characteristics (from Age to Savings) we use the values at December of the
year (t − 1).
a dummy variable
b Voluntary deductible: 0, 100, 200, 300, 400 or 500 euro
has taken out their health insurance through a collective. The average discount their
insurer gave in this period for choosing the maximum voluntary deductible is around
215 euros.
123
28 R. Dillingh et al.
4.1.2 Results
Table 2 shows the results of three random-effects GLS regression specifications of
Eq. (1). The dependent variable for the first column (A) is 1 for those who have taken
out complementary health insurance and 0 for those who have not. Each regression
includes, next to probability numeracy, several background characteristics and addi-
tional information on a few forms of risky behavior.6
The regression results show that in analysis (A) probability numeracy appears to
have a statistically significant, non-monotonic relationshipwith complementary health
insurance. First, the take out of complementary health insurance seems to rise with
probability numeracy and then, at the higher numeracy levels, it appears to fall again.
The tipping point is reached at a numeracy level of 10.0.Given the previously discussed
distribution of probability numeracy in our sample, this means that a small majority of
our sample occupies the range in which the relationship between probability numeracy
and complementary health insurance is negative.7
Table 2 also shows a strong and significant relationship between age and gender
on the one hand and complementary health insurance on the other hand. This is in
accordance to what we previously described to be the case in the general population.
The age at which health insurance takeout peaks seems to be around 56 years in our
sample, which would be below the population peak, but graphs for both genders seem
rather flat for quite a substantial age frame. Women on average have complementary
health insurancemore often.Also in accordance toVektis, we find a significant positive
effect of having a collective basic health insurance on the choice for complementary
health insurance. Those whose insurer offers a larger premium discount at a voluntary
deductible of 500 euros tend to opt less often for a complementary health insurance,
which is consistent with having the goal of spending as little as possible on health
insurance.
People who asses their own health to be relatively good also tend to be less insured,
as can be expected. A good health lowers the expected benefits of (complementary)
health insurance. Wealth related variables seem to be primarily insignificant, except
6 We have also looked at several alternative indicators for stated as well as revealed risk preferences.
Including these variables lead to a substantial loss in observations and in the smaller subsamples the
coefficients of these risk measures turned out to be largely insignificant, while the main conclusions on the
effect of probability numeracy on health insurance purchase do not change. For the specific willingness
to take risk in financial matters—which is what insurance purchase decisions are ultimately about—we
used the following question: “People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate
your willingness to take risks in the following areas? Your willingness to take risks...[in financial matters]”,
where 0means ‘highly risk averse’ and 10means ‘fully prepared to take risks’. For revealed risk preferences
we used the measures for risk aversion, prudence and temperance as derived by Noussair et al. (2014). In
their study, they asked subjects to choose between several pairs of gambles. These subjects were classified
as increasingly risk-averse when they preferred certain outcomes over uncertain outcomes with the same
expected value, prudent when they accepted more risk at higher levels of income or wealth and temperate
when they preferred not to add risk to risk but spread the risk as equally as possible over all options. All
three indicators were measured on a 0–5 scale, with 5 meaning maximally risk averse, prudent or temperate.
7 As a robustness check we also performed this analysis with respondents divided into five quintiles.
Regression results show the same inverted U shape, with a peak at the middle quintile. Such a peak between
the 40th and the 60th percentile is consistent with our parametric results discussed above.
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Probability numeracy 0.041∗∗ 0.075∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.036) (0.008)
(Probability numeracy)2 −0.002∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)




Self-assessed health status −0.024∗∗∗ −0.016 0.080∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.022) (0.021)
Female 0.073∗∗∗ 0.041 −0.112∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.035) (0.036)
Couple 0.018 0.037 −0.115∗∗
(0.018) (0.035) (0.052)
Homeowner 0.015 −0.030 0.120∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.040)
Self-employed −0.024 0.107∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.109)
Log(net household income/month) 0.053 0.640 −0.321
(0.118) (0.425) (0.527)
[Log(net household income/month)]2 −0.003 −0.049∗ 0.024
(0.007) (0.030) (0.034)
Number of children at home 0.002 −0.040∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.007) (0.023) (0.028)
Educ(2)—Intermediate secondary 0.003 0.014 −0.138∗
(0.025) (0.056) (0.075)






Educ(5)—Higher vocational 0.027 0.051 0.001
(0.026) (0.063) (0.087)
Educ(6)—University 0.014 0.027 0.201∗
(0.034) (0.085) (0.119)
Smoker −0.055∗∗∗ −0.029 0.080∗∗
(0.015) (0.030) (0.041)
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Daily drinker −0.021 0.046∗ −0.041
(0.014) (0.024) (0.038)
Obese −0.016 0.012 0.003
(0.017) (0.045) (0.043)
Savings > e25,000 −0.023∗ 0.033 0.025
(0.013) (0.034) (0.042)
Collective insurance 0.049∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.167∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.029) (0.035)




Alpha 0.004 0.058 0.000
(0.011) (0.042) (0.022)
Year = 2010 0.004 −0.056∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.008) (0.025) (0.021)
Year = 2011 0.001 0.104∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.019) (0.027)
Constant 0.073 1.862 1.301
(0.494) (1.553) (2.051)
R2 0.058 0.065 0.066
N 2752 1421 2534
N×T 5661 2596 5037
Hausman test p value 0.001∗∗∗ 0.769 0.010∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. For the personal background
characteristics (from Age to Savings) we use the values at December of the year (t − 1)
for a weak relationship with savings. Lower complementary health insurance takeout
for those with relatively substantial savings seems plausible.
The only measure of risky behavior that has a significant relationship with com-
plementary health insurance is smoking. Smokers tend to be less insured. The six
education dummies (the reference point is primary school) give no clear picture, but
those with intermediate vocational education seem to take out complementary health
insurance more often, compared to those with only primary education. The three year
dummies (the reference point is 2009) do not show the downward trend in com-
plementary health insurance that Vektis found on the population level over a longer
period, but over the specific interval 2009–2011 Vektis does not show a clear trend
either.
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4.2 Analysis B: Health Insurance Premiums
4.2.1 Introduction
In analysis A we looked at the take out of complementary health insurance. In this
analysis we look at what people spend on total health insurance premiums per month.
Of course these two variables are closely related. In fact, a regression specification
with total health insurance spending as dependent variable and complementary health
insurance as explaining variable would clearly show the expected relationships (and
render several other explanatory variables insignificant, partly due to endogeneity).
But because complementary health insurance policies come in many forms and price
ranges, total health insurance spending contains valuable additional information that
can be analyzed.
To make a clean comparison of the total monthly health insurance premiums,
we look at those who report they only pay the health insurance premiums for the
basic policy for themselves, not for their partner and/or children. Nearly half of
our panel reports also paying for their partner. A much smaller fraction reports
also paying premiums for one or more children, probably because basic health
and dental care for children below 18 is paid for by the government. Table 1,
column B, presents the descriptive statistics for the analysis on health insurance
premiums.
The selection of those only paying their ownpremiums causes a drop in observations
of about 54%. This selection also causes some predictable changes in the descriptive
statistics, e.g. a lower average age (50 years), a lower percentage of couples and less
children living at home.Thepercentageofwomen rises to 57.The share of homeowners
drops below two thirds. The number of smokers is slightly higher, the number of daily
drinkers slightly lower. The group with savings with a total value of over 25,000 euros
is a few percent lower. The percentage that has taken out their health insurance through
a collective has dropped to 53.
4.2.2 Results
Table 2, column B, shows the results of the random-effects GLS regression for this
analysis. The dependent variable is the natural log of total health insurance premiums.
Probability numeracy appears to have a statistically significant non-monotonic rela-
tionship with (the log of) total monthly health insurance premiums. This is comparable
to what we found with complementary health insurance takeout. First, the monthly
premiums seem to rise with probability numeracy and then, at the higher numeracy
levels, they appear to fall again.8 The tipping point lies at a numeracy level of 8.1 (on a
scale from 0 to 13). This means that the majority of our sample (over two thirds) occu-
8 We checked whether this effect was driven by having taken out a complementary health insurance in
the first place, because this is an important part of health insurance spending. But we find the same non-
monotone relationship for both those with and those without complementary health insurance. Significance
levels are lower, but that is also influenced by the smaller sample sizes.
123
32 R. Dillingh et al.
pies the range in which the relationship between probability numeracy and monthly
health premiums is negative.9
Again, we find a significant, non-monotonic relationship between age and monthly
health insurance premiums. The age at which monthly health insurance premiums
peak, seems to be around 58 years. Self-employed seem to pay higher health insur-
ance premiums on average. The only other personal characteristics with a significant
relationship with health insurance spending are household income and number of
children living at home. Household income has a non-monotonic relationship with
insurance spending. First insurance rises with income, then it falls. Households with
larger numbers of children tend to spend less onhealth insurance on average. Somewhat
surprisingly, other in analysis A established relationships between health insurance
takeout and for example gender, self-assessed health status or collective insurance do
not show up in this regression analysis.
There seems to be a slightly positive relationship between being a daily drinker
and health insurance spending. Insurance spending is slightly lower for those whose
insurer gives a larger discount for choosing the maximum voluntary deductible. The
year dummies suggest a drop in total health insurance spending in 2010 with a sub-
sequent rise in 2011.
4.3 Analysis C: Voluntary Deductible in Basic Health Insurance
4.3.1 Introduction
For everyone above 18 years there is a mandatory deductible per year within
the basic health insurance. This mandatory deductible was 150/165/170 euro in
2009/2010/2011. On top of that, people can freely choose a voluntary deductible
of 0, 100, 200, 300, 400 or 500 euro, irrespective of their deductible choice in previ-
ous years. A voluntary deductible of 500 euro typically means a premium discount of
somewhat over 200 euro. Table 1, column C, presents some descriptive statistics on
the panel data set we have constructed on voluntary deductibles. The differences with
Table 1, column A, are caused by those who answered that they did not know their
voluntary deductible, which leads to a drop in observations of about 11%. The effects
on the descriptive statistics for the other variables are minimal.
4.3.2 Results
Table 2, column C, shows the results of the random-effects GLS regression on the
voluntary deductible choice. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 5, with 5
representing a voluntary deductible of 500 euros. We find a significant negative
relationship between probability numeracy and the voluntary deductible in the basic
9 Again, as a robustness check we also performed this analysis with respondents divided into five quintiles.
Regression results show the same invertedU shape, with a peak at the second quintile, thus at a relatively low
level of numeracy. Such a peak between the 20th and the 40th percentile is consistent with our parametric
results discussed above.
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health insurance. High levels of probability numeracy coincide with a lower voluntary
deductible.10 There is a significant negative relationship between age and the voluntary
deductible as well, in accordance with the findings of Vektis (2013). Because the aver-
age (expected) health care costs rise significantlywith age, thiswas to be expected. This
effect is also shown by the fact that people who asses their own health to be relatively
good tend to accept more financial risk in the form of a higher voluntary deductible.
We find that women are significantly less inclined to choose a voluntary deductible.
Couples seem to choose a lower voluntary deductible on average too, but on the other
hand the voluntary deductible appears to rise with the number of children in the
household. That concerns the age group for which Vektis found a temporary rise in
voluntary deductible as well. An explanation might be that people with children in
the household are themselves in an age group with relatively low health costs and at
the same time are the relatively healthy persons within their age group. Remember
that the children are exempted from paying health insurance premiums or any kind of
deductible. It might also have to do with the fact that households with more children
ceteris paribus face a tighter budget constraint in the short run. A higher voluntary
deductible would then help reduce their monthly spending on health insurance.
Homeowners seem to choose a relatively higher deductible. Those who took out
their health insurance collectively (e.g. through an employer, an association or trade
union) on average have a lower voluntary deductible. Those whose health insurance
company offers a relatively high premium discount at a voluntary deductible of 500
euros have higher deductibles on average. The education dummies suggest a slightly
positive relationship between educational level and deductible choice. The year dum-
mies seem to capture the trend that more people choose a positive voluntary deductible
each year (Vektis 2011).
Self-employed tend to choose a higher voluntary deductible. Smoking is slightly
positively correlated with choosing a voluntary deductible, drinking and obesity seem
tohave little correlationwith deductible choice.Alpha is, again, not significant, so over-
estimating small chances does not seem to have an impact on deductible choice either.
5 Discussion
In this study we examined whether the demand for health insurance is affected by the
individual’s level of probability numeracy.We find that the relationship between prob-
ability numeracy and two out of three health insurance purchase decisions appears to
be non-monotonic. Complementary health insurance takeout and total monthly expen-
diture on health insurance first rise with probability numeracy and then, at the higher
numeracy levels, start to fall again. For the third health insurance purchase decision we
find that high levels of probability numeracy coincide with a lower deductible choice
in the Dutch universal health insurance.
How do these results compare to the previously formulated hypothesis that less
numerate individuals are less likely to deviate from the default choice? Can this
10 The robustness check with respondents divided into five quintiles also shows a drop in voluntary
deductible choice with numeracy. The 20% with the lowest level of numeracy choose the highest voluntary
deductible, consistent with our parametric results discussed above.
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explain the relationship we found between probability numeracy and health insur-
ance purchase?
Obviously, the status quo bias alone cannot explain the non-monotonic relationship
that we found in two of our three analyses. The low level of health insurance purchase
by the least numerate could be attributed to inertia, but for the subsequent drop in health
insurance purchase from a certain intermediate level of numeracy another explanation
is needed. This explanation might be ambiguity aversion, since this tends to raise
the incentive to insure (Alary et al. 2013). When you are better capable of assessing
the true risks you face, you can be more selective in your choices for what to insure
and how much. When the less numerate perceive the risks they are confronted with
as more ambiguous, they will on average choose higher health insurance. Ambiguity
aversion has been linked to limited capabilities to deal with complexity and to bounded
rationality before (see e.g. Halevy 2007; Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009).
In the case of the voluntary deductible choice within the Dutch basic health insur-
ance, the found relationship between numeracy and health insurance purchase can also
not be explained by more status quo bias for the probability innumerate. The usual
default currently is a zero voluntary deductible. Yet, the less numerate on average
seem to choose a higher voluntary deductible.
Because the Dutch basic health insurance is obligatory, choosing a positive
deductible is effectively the only way to ‘un-insure’ to a certain extent. Possibly, this
relatively high interest in ‘un-insuring’ is due to the inability of the very innumerate
to appreciate what insurance is and why you should pay money for it. If a person does
not see a utility difference between being insured and not being insured, it may be an
attractive strategy to simply go for the cheapest option (at least in the short term). Since
insurance typically comes at a direct cost this implies that the very innumerate will buy
as little insurance as possible (irrespective of the default). An alternative explanation
might be that there is a relation between numeracy and classification errors. We find
relatively high levels of voluntary deductibles in our sample, which could be due to
mistakes. If especially less numerate people have a higher tendency to state incorrectly
that they have taken out a voluntary deductible, this could also help explain the rela-
tionship we find. The fact that those who report that they do not know their voluntary
deductible are on average significantly less numerate supports this hypothesis.
The combination of avoiding health insurance by the least numerate and ambiguity
aversion could explain the non-monotonic relationship that we found between proba-
bility numeracy and health insurance. Admittedly, this explanation is constructed ex
post, and rather speculative. An assessment of its validity and generalizability would
require further study. The hypothesis would then be that a minimal level of numeracy
is needed to have an interest in purchasing insurance at all. Health insurance purchase
will peak at a numeracy level at which people are able to see the value in insurance but
are unable to make reasonable risk assessments. At excess of that level of numeracy,
people becomemore andmore able to determine the actual level of risk instead of expe-
riencing a state of ambiguity. That would allow them to choose a better aimed—and
on average lower—level of insurance.
For policy makers it is relevant to know if they can expect this non-monotonic
relationship between numeracy and health insurance purchase to occur. Certain forms
and levels of health insurance can be efficient from a private perspective aswell as from
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a collective perspective. Commercial parties have a natural incentive to help people
overcome inertia and buy health insurance (at least in the case of the relatively good
risks), but theywill not necessarily feel the need to prevent people from over-insurance
because of low numeracy and ambiguity aversion. This would present policy makers
with a challenge. Their goal should be to get people to be both active and selective in
their health insurance purchase decisions. Though Gaurav et al. (2011) showed that
financial training could help people to overcome inertia, whether financial training
can also help diminish ambiguity aversion and thus lower over-insurance by the less
numerate could be a another subject for further study.
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Appendix 1: LISS Panel Data—Studies and Variables Used
1 - Background Variables (December 2008–2011)
age, gender, couple, number of children in the household, homeowner, self-
employed, net household income, education
2 -Health: LissCore Study—wave 3 (November 2009) throughwave 5 (November
2011)
Analysis A: complementary health insurance (yes/no)
Analysis B: health insurance premiums, in log(euro per month)
Analysis C: voluntary deductible (0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 euro)
self-assessed health status, smoking, drinking, bmi, collective/individual health
insurance, who pays premiums for whom
9 - Assets: Liss Core Study—wave 1 (June 2008) and wave 2 (June 2010)
savings (total value current accounts, savings accounts, etc. is over 25.000 euro
(yes/no))
33 - Disease Prevention (September 2008)
Probability Numeracy (scale from 0 to 13, see “Appendix 2”)
Alpha’s (under/overestimating small probabilities)
38 - Measuring Higher Order Risk Attitudes of the General Population (Decem-
ber 2009)
risk aversion, prudence, temperance
49 - Commercial Opportunities (August 2010)
risk attitude (financial)
More information about the LISS panel can be found at: www.lissdata.nl.
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Appendix 2: Probability Numeracy Scale
Table 3 Probability numeracy—questions
Question Data type Correct answer % correct
1 Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die
1000 times. Out of 1000 rolls, how
many times do you think the die would
come up even (2, 4, or 6)? In...out of
1000 times
Numeric (0...1000) 500 64.4
2 In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the
chances of winning a $10.00 prize are
1%. What is your best guess about how
many people would win a $10.00 prize
if 1000 people each buy a single ticket
from BIG BUCKS?
Numeric (0...1000) 10 75.4
3 In the ACME PUBLISHING
SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of
winning a car is 1 in 1000. What
percent of tickets of ACME
PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a
car?...% of the tickets
Numeric (0...100) 0.1 52.4
4 Which of the following numbers
represents the biggest risk of getting a
disease? (1–1 in 100, 2–1 in 1000, 3–1
in 10)
1,2,3 3 76.8
5 Which of the following represents the
biggest risk of getting a disease?
(1–1%, 2–10%, 3–5%)
1,2,3 2 82.3
6 If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is
1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?
Text “2%”, “1/50”, etc. 83.2
7 If Person A’s chance of getting a disease
is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s
risk is double that of A, what is B’s
risk?
Text “2 in 100”, “2%”, etc. 78.2
8 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%,
how many people would be expected to
get the disease? Out of 100...people
will get the disease
Numeric (0...100) 10 91.5
9 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%,
how many people would be expected to
get the disease? Out of 1000...people
will get the disease
Numeric (0...1000) 100 89.9
10 If the chance of getting a disease is 20
out of 100, this would be the same as
having a...% chance of getting the
disease
Numeric (0...100) 20 73.1
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Table 3 continued
Question Data type Correct answer % correct
11 The chance of getting a viral infection is
0.0005. Out of 10,000 people, about
how many of them are expected to get
infected?...out of 10,000 people
Numeric (0..10000) 5 61.0
12a What do you think is the chance that
tomorrow it will be cloudy where you
live?
Numeric (0...100)
12b What do you think is the chance that
tomorrow it will be cloudy and rain
where you live?
Numeric (0...100) P(12a)≥P(12b) 87.1
13a What do you think is the chance that you
will still be alive 10 years from now?a
Numeric (0...100)
13b What do you think is the chance that you
will still be alive 20 years from now?a
Numeric (0...100) P(13a)≥P(13b) 95.2
a Half of the respondents received the opposite question: the chance of having died 10 and 20 years from
now. The respective answers were judged accordingly
Source: Carman and Kooreman (2014) and authors’ calculations on LISS data
Table 4 Probability
numeracy—descriptive statistics
Probability numeracy Frequency Percent Cumulative
1 17 0.30 0.30
2 41 0.72 1.02
3 90 1.58 2.60
4 118 2.07 4.67
5 173 3.04 7.71
6 234 4.11 11.82
7 319 5.60 17.42
8 416 7.30 24.72
9 547 9.60 34.32
10 636 11.17 45.49
11 827 14.52 60.01
12 1040 18.26 78.27
13 1238 21.73 100.00
Total 5696 10,000
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